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FACTS OF GUNNISON DAIRY CONTESTED BY MARTELLA 
In its Brief, Gunnison Dairy sets forth its own version of the facts. Martella 
respectfully disputes the following facts: 
9. Letters from Martella or counsel for Martella written 
prior to the date set for closing as well as statements by Martella to 
partners of the Gunnison Dairy reflected a clear understanding that 
feed was part of the [C]ontract and that the closing would not occur 
without a resolution of the amount payable and other terms with 
respect to the feed. 
(Brief of Appellees, p. 6). Said factual assertion is a conclusion or inference 
drawn exclusively by Gunnison Dairy, not by stipulation of the parties. At no time 
has Martella acknowledged or conceded to the proposition that the purchase of 
feed was part of the Contact. Martella specifically stated in his affidavit filed in 
support of his Motion for Summary Judgment, "[i]t was my understanding that the 
Contract neither obligated me to buy Gunnison Dairy's feed nor required the 
parties to establish an agreement regarding the purchase of Gunnison Dairy's feed 
as a condition to performing under the Contract." (R. 264:9) 
10. Martella complained about his obligation to pay for feed 
in discussions between the parties weeks before the closing date of 
October 9, 1998. 
(Brief of Appellees, p. 6). Said factual assertion supposes the validity of Gunnison 
Dairy's previous assertion that the purchase of feed was part of the Contract. 
Again, at no time has Martella acknowledged or conceded that the purchase of feed 
was part of the Contract. Any complaining or protest by Martella stemmed from 
1 
Gunnison Dairy's unilateral attempts to include the purchase of "feed on hand" (as 
defined by Gunnison Dairy to include ungrown crops or crops in the field) as part 
of the Contract. 
11. Martella conceded that he had to pay for some Feed at 
the dairy complex in several discussions with different partners of 
Gunnison Dairy, e.g.: Gene Yardley and Douglas Bjerregaard. 
(Brief of Appellees, p. 6). Again, said factual assertion supposes the validity of 
Gunnison Dairy's previous assertion that the purchase of feed was part of the 
Contract. Martella acknowledges that he did offer to purchase some of Gunnison 
Dairy's feed, but said offer was only done as a courtesy to the Gunnison Dairy in 
an effort to cultivate goodwill between the parties. (R. 265:10) ("I entered into 
negotiations with Defendants for the purchase of their feed, mainly as a courtesy to 
them."). 
ARGUMENT 
I. REPLY TO GUNNISON DAIRY'S POINT I - THE CONTRACT 
UNAMBIGUOUSLY EXCLUDES THE PURCHASE OF FEED 
ON HAND. 
Gunnison Dairy is correct in its recitation of Utah law regarding the use of 
parole evidence when interpreting a written contract. However, said argument 
misses Martella's main point; that being that the Contract unambiguously excluded 
2 
feed on hand as an asset being purchased.1 In asserting that the Contract did not 
encompass the purchase of "feed on hand," Martella has never asked the Court to 
rely on extrinsic evidence, rather he has asked the Court to look within the "four 
corners" of the Contract and its accompanying addenda. From the "four corners" 
of the Contract and its accompanying addenda it is clear that "feed on hand" was 
not being purchased. 
The only place feed is discussed in the entire contract is paragraph 5 of 
Addendum #1. Paragraph 5 reads, "[p]rice does not include feed on hand, value to 
be negotiated at time of closing." Martella has asserted throughout the course of 
the litigation that the phrase "[p]rice does not include feed on hand" should be 
interpreted literally to mean "the price (or the transaction) does not include feed." 
Martella has also asserted throughout the litigation that the phrase "value to be 
negotiated at time of closing" refers to a separate transaction that the parties had 
contemplated making, but had not conditioned performance under the Contract on. 
1
 Stated another way, the Contract neither provided for the sale and purchase of 
"feed on hand" nor was the Contract conditioned on the parties reaching a separate 
agreement regarding the purchase of "feed on hand." 
On the other hand, Gunnison Dairy has submitted numerous items of parole 
evidence in support of its position that the Contract was intended to encompass the 
purchase of its "feed on hand." Said parole evidence includes affidavits from 
Gunnison Dairy partners, and an affidavit from Gunnison Dairy's veterinarian as 
well as portions of correspondence from Martella's counsel. 
3 
A simple review of the personal property being sold under the Contract 
supports Martella's literal interpretation.3 As discussed at length in Martella's 
Opening Brief, Section 1.1 of the Contract and Addendum #1 to the Listing 
Agreement (also known as the "Inventory List") conclusively list all items of 
personal property being sold under the Contract. However, paragraph 1.1 of the 
Contract and the Inventory List speak nothing of feed. Surely the parties would 
have listed "feed" or "feed on hand" as an asset being sold if they had intended to 
include it. 
The parties' intent, as to the treatment of "feed on hand," is clear from a 
simple inquiry into the plain language of the Contract. The trial court did not need 
to look outside of the "four corners" of the Contract to determine the parties' 
intent. However, the trial court did consider parole evidence. Specifically, the trial 
court considered the fact that Martella had visited the dairy complex and seen 
Gunnison Dairy's "feed on hand" prior to executing the Contract as well as the fact 
that the most practicable way to perform daily feeding of the dairy animals is to 
draw from the inventory of feed on hand at the dairy site. (R. 364-65). Not only 
3
 See Browns Shoe Fit v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("In 
interpreting a contract, we determine what the parties intended by examining the 
entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other, giving an objective and 
reasonable construction to the contract as a whole. Where questions arise in the 
interpretation of an agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document 
itself. It should be looked at in its entirety and in accordance with its purpose. All 
of its parts should be given effect insofar as that is possible." (citations omitted). 
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did the trial court err in relying upon this extrinsic evidence, it drew inferences 
from this evidence that were not favorable to Martella, the losing party. 
Accordingly, Martella requests that the trial court's decision be reversed and 
Martella's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. 
II. REPLY TO GUNNISON DAIRY'S POINT NUMBER 2 - A 
CONTRACT CAN BE ENFORCED EVEN WHEN A 
MATERIAL TERM IS OMITTED. 
Even if this Court affirms the trial court's analysis that "the parties intended 
feed to be an item included and being sold under the REPC," the Contract should 
still be enforced. This Court in Brown's Shoe Fit v. Olch 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998), restated and acknowledged the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in 
Reedv.Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Utah 1980), which held: 
There is no principle in equity that demands all the terms of the 
contract must be set forth in the written agreement. Rather, although 
an agreement is uncertain or incomplete in some respects, its specific 
performance may nevertheless be decreed where the uncertainty 
relates to matters which the law makes certain or complete by 
presumption, rule or custom, or usage. When the major aspects of the 
contract are specified with requisite certainty, this court will not allow 
incidental details in a contract to deny specific performance. 
This Court in Brown's Shoe Fit further stated that provisions of a contract 
otherwise capable of enforcement should not be ignored. See Id. 
After concluding, as a matter of law, that the parties "intended the 'feed on 
hand' to be an item included and being sold under the REPC," the trial court 
should have filled in the gaps and enforced the Contract using custom and usage or 
5 
instead bifurcated/excluded the feed portion of the Contract and enforced the rest.4 
The trial court needed only to look as far as Gunnison Dairy's Memorandum 
and Affidavits filed in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment to determine 
the quantity and price of the "feed on hand." See generally (R. 108-224).5 
Eugene Jensen, a managing partner of the Gunnison Dairy, stated in his affidavit, 
that "feed on hand," at the time of closing, consisted of: 
[A] small amount of hold-over feed not only on or at the Dairy 
compound, Dairy complex, in silage pits on the Dairy property, 
together with the highly significant grain, alfalfa, hay, straw and baled 
oat-hay . . . together with that standing in the fields nearby (or in 
reasonable proximity to the Dairy complex) . . . sufficient to maintain 
the Dairy for not less than 12 consecutive calendar months. 
(R. 163-64:10). Eugene Jensen further stated: 
In each year "feed on hand" as of September 30 or October 15 there 
has been recorded as a consistent quantity, on the basis of tonnage, 
largely $750,000 worth of feed exclusive or that under binding and 
enforceable contract for immediate delivery to the Dairy feed 
sufficient for much more than one years demands; and more than 
$750,000 in value of feed was physically at the Dairy on October 9, 
1998, the proposed closing date. 
4
 It is important to note that the trial court held that only the portion of the Contract 
regarding the treatment of feed was an agreement to agree. The trial court made 
no conclusion of indefmiteness as to the remaining provisions of the Contract 
which would have made up over 80% of a global transaction with feed included. 
5
 See also Brief of Appellees, p. 10 ("[I]t is important to point out that the 
estimated value of the feed on hand at the date set for closing was at least 
$736,000...."). 
6 
(R. 164:10) (Emphasis added). Douglas F. Bjerregaard, comptroller for the 
Gunnison Dairy, in his Affidavit, stated: 
I was present on the 5 day of October, 1998 at a time when Plaintiff 
met also with Eugene A. Jensen, the partner having been given 
discretion and authority (with my concurrence) to enter into contracts 
for the sale underlying which is this action; also present were four 
other members of the partnership all of which act as "advisory 
committeemen". At that meeting there was handed to Mr. Martella a 
statement of the amount of feed which would be at the Dairy or in the 
fields on the day of his (Plaintiffs) proposed closing date of [as stated 
in the Complaint October 9, 1998] amounts in tonnage and 
mathematical extensions by unit, using conservative values, and 
totally each character and property of the different types of feed 
having a reasonable value (under any condition) equal to the sum of 
between $700,000 and $800,000. 
(R. 187-88:17) (Emphasis added). Robert Colbert, DVM, Gunnison Dairy's 
Consulting Veterinarian stated in his Affidavit: 
It is my professional opinion that at any time for the production of 
milk, the maintenance of the "heifers; and the progeny of the milk 
cows there should be on hand for immediate accessible use by the 
management of the Dairy a minimum of 4,000 tons of corn and 6,400 
tons of dry hay for a yearly feed inventory. Other feed on hand or in 
inventory includes oat hay, barley, corn, canola, soy plus and mineral 
mixes as well as straw used for bedding purposes . . . . I do not 
express any specific amount or quantity of any one of the foregoing 
constituents to available feed but in the interpretation of the term 
"feed on hand" there should be a gross tonnage of a combination all of 
the foregoing feed which at general prices for which those crops and 
which provender was being furnished to the animals a minimum 
amount would be $740,000 in value. 
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(R. 223-24:4-6) (Emphasis added). Martella did not contest these facts on 
Summary Judgment. These undisputed facts establish not only the quantity but 
most importantly the price of the "feed on hand" at the time of closing. 
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that "[i]t was the priceof feed 
that was not included," that the method contemplated under the Contract for 
calculating the price was negotiation, and that it was "impossible for the Court to 
order the parties to negotiate." (R. 365). The trial court erred in its conclusion 
because it failed to acknowledge that the parties did not need to negotiate; that is, 
the parties both agreed, for purposes of the Summary Judgment cross-motions, that 
Gunnison Dairy's definition and valuation of feed was acceptable.6 Martella did 
not contest the above-quoted definitions and valuations contained in the numerous 
affidavits filed in support of Gunnison Dairy's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Accordingly, Martella requests that the trial courts decision be reversed and 
Martella's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. 
III. REPLY TO GUNNISON DAIRY'S POINT NUMBER 3 -
ALTHOUGH FEED IS ESSENTIAL TO THE DAIRY IN ALL 
RESPECTS, THE FEED'S ORIGIN IS NOT. 
Gunnison Dairy's third point appears to have little bearing on the disposition 
of the case other than to establish the point that feed is material to a successful 
6
 See (R. 255-56) ("For purposes of this argument only Martella will not dispute 
Gunnison Dairy's inflated and exaggerated definition of 'feed on hand,' which 
includes crops still in the field and even ungrown crops."). 
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Dairy operation and thus a material element of the Contract. Martella never 
contested the idea that feed was essential to the successful operation of the Dairy, 
rather Martella argued that the origin of the feed is of no consequence. Thus any 
inference drawn by the trial court regarding the parties intentions was inappropriate 
and grounds for reversal. 
IV. REPLY TO GUNNISON DAIRY'S POINT NUMBER 4 - TO 
SAY THAT THE MANDATORY MEDIATION PROVISION OF 
THE CONTRACT IS NOT ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE THE 
CONTRACT OMITTED A MATERIAL TERM IS 
INEQUITABLE AND CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. 
Gunnison Dairy's argument that it was not bound by the mandatory 
mediation provision of the Contract because the Contract was unenforceable is 
inequitable and contrary to public policy. Utah Law favors the speedy and 
inexpensive resolution of disputes through varied forms of alternative dispute 
resolution. See Devore v. IHC Hospital, Inc, 884 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Utah 1994); 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-31b-3(2) (purposes of the Utah Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Act). To further this public policy Utah has adopted the Utah 
Arbitration Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-31 a-1 et al) and the Utah Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-1 et al). Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3 la-3 requires that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon 
grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement...." Although said 
9 
statute refers directly to arbitration agreements and arbitration provisions within 
contracts, the principle of the statute surely applies to mediation agreements and 
mediation provisions within a contract. 
V. REPLY TO GUNNISON DAIRY'S POINT NUMBER 5 - THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE AND ITS OFFICIAL 
COMMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE GUIDANCE AS TO 
HOW TO "FILL IN THE GAPS.95 
Gunnison Dairy, cites to Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204(3) and claims that it 
does not give the Court a reasonable basis for "determining or calculating" the 
purchase price of the feed on hand. However, § 70A-2-204 is only a restatement of 
the principles regarding "open terms" underlying later sections of Article Two of 
n 
Utah's Commercial Code. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-305 speaks directly to 
contracts containing "open price terms." Section 70A-2-305(l) states: 
The parties if they so intended can conclude a contract for sale even 
though the price is not settled. In such a case the price is a reasonable 
price at the time for delivery if: 
(a) nothing is said as to price; or 
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to 
agree; or 
7
 See Official Comments to § 2-204(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (1977) 
("Subsection (3) states the principle as to "open terms" underlying later sections of 
the Article"). Although Utah has not adopted the "official comments" to Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[i]n 
interpreting provisions of our code, we often turn to the official comments of the 
Uniform Commercial Code for guidance." Scharfv.BMGCorp, 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). 
10 
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or 
other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency 
and it is not so set or recorded. 
(emphasis added). Martella submits that a "reasonable price" for the "feed on 
hand," at the time of closing, was market price. Gunnison Dairy through its own 
admission/affidavits has stated that the market price for the feed was between 
$700,000 and $800,000, more specifically between $736,000-750,000. (R. 164:10, 
187-88:17, 223-24:4-6, Brief of Appellees, p. 10). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Martella respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's grant of Summary Judgment in favor of Gunnison 
Dairy and, instead, grant Summary Judgment in favor of Martella. Specifically, 
Martella requests that Summary Judgment be entered in his behalf with a finding 
that the parties did not intend feed on hand to be an item included and being sold 
under the Contract, or, in the alternative, that $736,000 be inserted as the price for 
the feed on hand, with payment to be made the same as the rest of the Contract. In 
the alternative, Martella respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's ruling and remand the case to the Sixth District Court for further 
proceedings. 
11 
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